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Abstract. Cooperative games provide a framework for fair and stable
profit allocation in multi-agent systems. Core, least-core and nucleolus
are such solution concepts that characterize stability of cooperation. In
this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on the least-core and nucleolus
of threshold cardinality matching games (TCMG). A TCMG is defined
on a graph G = (V,E) and a threshold T , in which the player set is V
and the profit of a coalition S ⊆ V is 1 if the size of a maximum matching
in G[S] meets or exceeds T , and 0 otherwise. We first show that for a
TCMG, the problems of computing least-core value, finding and verifying
least-core payoff are all polynomial time solvable. We also provide a
general characterization of the least core for a large class of TCMG.
Next, based on Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in matching theory, we
give a concise formulation of the nucleolus for a typical case of TCMG
which the threshold T equals 1. When the threshold T is relevant to the
input size, we prove that the nucleolus can be obtained in polynomial
time in bipartite graphs and graphs with a perfect matching.
1 Introduction
One of the important problems in cooperative game is how to distribute the total
profit generated by a group of agents to individual participants. The prerequisite
here is to make all the agents work together, i.e., form a grand coalition. To
achieve this goal, the collective profit should be distributed properly so as to
minimize the incentive of subgroups of agents to deviate and form coalitions of
their own. This intuition is formally captured by several solution concepts, such
as the core, the least-core, and the nucleolus, which will be the focus of this
paper.
The algorithmic issues in cooperative games are especially interesting since
the definitions of many solution concepts would involve in an exponential num-
ber of constraints [20]. Megiddo [17] suggested that finding a solution should
be done by an efficient algorithm (following Edmonds [9]), i.e., within time
polynomial in the number of agents. Deng and Papadimitriou [8] suggested the
computational complexity be taken into consideration as another measure of
fairness for evaluating and comparing different solution concepts. Subsequently,
⋆ Email: sunxiaoming@ict.ac.cn
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various interesting complexity and algorithmic results have been investigated.
On one hand, efficient algorithms have been proposed for computing the core,
the least-core and the nucleolus, such as, for assignment games [22], standard
tree games [13], matching games [14], airport profit games [4], spanning connec-
tivity games [2], flow games [6] and weighted voting games [11]. On the other
hand, some negative results are given. For example, the problems of computing
the nucleolus and testing whether a given distribution belongs to the core or the
nucleolus are proved to be NP-hard for minimum spanning tree games [12], flow
games and linear production games [6].
Matching game is one of the most important combinatorial cooperative games
which has attracted much attention [3, 5, 7, 14, 21, 22]. Assignment game is a
special case of matching game defined on a bipartite graph, which is introduced
by Shapley and Shubik [21] to formulate two-sided markets. In this case, the
core is always non-empty, and the nucleolus can be found in polynomial time
[22]. For matching games defined on general graphs, Deng, et al., [7] gave a
sufficient and necessary condition on the non-emptiness of the core. Kern and
Paulusma [14] presented an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for
cardinality matching games based on a polynomial description of the least-core
of such games. Recently, Biro´, Kern, and Paulusma [3] generalized the work
of [22] to develope an efficient algorithm for computing the nucleolus for matching
games on weighted graphs when the core is nonempty. Chen, Lu and Zhang
[5] further discussed the fractional matching games. However, for the matching
games defined on general weighted graphs, the computational complexity on the
least-core and the nucleolus is still open.
We follow the stream and study the least-core and nucleolus of a natural
variation of matching games, called threshold matching games [1]. In this game
model, each agent controls a vertex in an edge-weighted graph, and a coalition
wins only if the maximum weighted matching in the induced subgraph meets or
exceeds a given threshold value. Although Haris et al [1] proved that computing
the least-core and the nucleolus for threshold matching games defined on general
weighted graphs is NP-hard, the related algorithmic problems have not been
discussed when restricted to unweighted graphs.
In this paper, we aim to compute the least-core and the nucleolus for the
threshold matching games on unweighted graph, especially when the core is
empty. Firstly, we show that for an arbitrary threshold value, the least-core can
be obtained in polynomial time through separation oracle technique. By linear
program duality, we further provide a general characterization of the least core
for a large class of threshold cardinality matching games, which can be used to
simplify the sequence of linear programs of the nucleolus. Secondly, we discuss
the algorithms for the nucleolus. In the case that the threshold is independent of
input size, the nucleolus can be found in polynomial time. Especially, when the
threshold being one (which is called edge coalitional games), we know that finding
the least-core and the nucleolus can be done efficiently based on a clear descrip-
tion of the least-core. When the threshold value is relevant to the input size, we
prove that the least-core and the nucleolus can also be computed in polynomial
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time for the games on two typical graphs, the graphs with a perfect matching or
bipartite graphs. To our surprise, in all the cases considered, the least-core and
the nucleolus do not depend on the value of the threshold. We conjecture our
method can be generalized into dealing with general graphs. Besides, we estab-
lish the relationship between the least-core of a threshold matching game and
the mixed Nash Equilibrium of a non-cooperative two-person zero-sum game,
called matching intercept game.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we introduce some
concepts in cooperative game theory, and the definitions of threshold matching
game (TMG) and threshold cardinality matching game (TCMG). In section 3, we
discuss the least-core for TCMGs. Section 4, section 5 and section 6 are dedicated
to the efficient algorithms for computing the nucleolus of edge coalitional games
(ECG), TCMG on graphs with a perfect matching, and TCMG on bipartite
graphs.
2 Preliminary and Definition
2.1 Cooperative Game Theory
A cooperative game Γ = (N, v) consists of a player set N = {1, 2, · · · , n} and a
value function v : 2N → R with v(∅) = 0. ∀S ⊆ N , v(S) represents the profit
obtained by S without the help of others.
A game Γ = (N, v) is monotone if v(S′) ≤ v(S) whenever S′ ⊆ S. A simple
game is a monotonic game with v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1.
A coalition S ⊆ N is winning if v(S) = 1, and losing if v(S) = 0. A player i is
called a veto player if he belongs to all winning coalitions. It is easy to see that
i is a veto player if and only if v(N) = 1 but v(N \ {i}) = 0.
In cooperative games, we focus on how to distribute the total profit v(N)
in a fair or stable way. Different requirements on fairness and stability lead to
different kinds of distributions, which are generally referred to solution concepts.
In this paper, we focus on three solutions based on stability: the core, the least-
core and the nucleolus.
Given a cooperative game Γ = (N, v), we use x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn) to rep-
resent the payoff vector while xi is the payoff for player i. For convenience, let
x(S) ,
∑
i∈S xi. We say a payoff vector x is an imputation of Γ , if x(N) = v(N)
and ∀i ∈ N , xi ≥ v({i}) (individual rationality). The core of Γ is defined as:
C(Γ ) := {x ∈ Rn : x(N) = v(N) and x(S) ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N}.
A payoff vector in C(Γ ) guarantees that any coalition S can not get more profit
if it breaks away from the grand coalition. This is called group rationality.
When C(Γ ) = ∅, there is a nature relaxation of the core: the least-core. Given
ε ≤ 0, an imputation x is in the ε-core of Γ , if it satisfies x(S) ≥ v(S) + ε for
all S ⊂ N . Let
ε∗ := sup{ε|ε-core of Γ is nonempty}.
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The ε∗-core is called the least-core of Γ , denoted by LC(Γ ), and the value ε∗ is
called the LC(Γ ) value. Obviously, the optimal solution of the following linear
program LP1 is exactly the value and the imputations in LC(Γ ):
LP1 :
max ε
s.t.

x(S) ≥ v(S) + ε, ∀S ⊂ N
xi ≥ v({i}), ∀i ∈ N
x(N) = v(N).
Now we turn to the concept of the nucleolus. Given any imputation x, the
excess of a coalition S under x is defined as e(x, S) = x(S) − v(S), which can
be viewed as the satisfaction degree of the coalition S under the given x. The
excess vector is the vector θ(x) = (e(x, S1), e(x, S2), · · · , e(x, S2n−2)), where
S1, · · · , S2n−2 is a list of all nontrivial subsets of N that satisfies e(x, S1) ≤
e(x, S2) ≤ · · · ≤ e(x, S2n−2). The nucleolus of the game Γ , denoted by η(Γ ), is
the imputation x that lexicographically maximizes the excess vector θ(x).
Kopelowitz [15], as well as Maschler, Peleg and Shapley [16] proposed that
η(Γ ) can be computed by recursively solving the following sequential linear pro-
grams SLP (η(Γ )) (k = 1, 2, · · · ):
LPk :
max ε
s.t.

x(S) = v(S) + εr, ∀S ∈ Jr r = 0, 1, · · · , k − 1
x(S) ≥ v(S) + ε, ∀S ∈ 2N \ ∪k−1r=0Jr
xi ≥ v({i}), ∀i ∈ N
x(N) = v(N).
Initially, we set J0 = {∅, N} and ε0 = 0. The number εr is the optimal value of
the r-th program LPr, and Jr = {S ⊆ N : x(S) = v(S) + εr, ∀x ∈ Xr}, where
Xr = {x ∈ Rn : (x, εr) is an optimal solution of LPr}. We call a coalition in Jr
fixed since its allocation is fixed to a number. Kopelowitz [15] showed that this
procedure converges in at most n steps. Moreover, the nucleolus always exists
and it is unique. When C(Γ ) 6= ∅, η(Γ ) ∈ C(Γ ); and η(Γ ) ∈ LC(Γ ), otherwise.
Proposition 1 [10, 18] A simple game Γ = (N, v) has a nonempty core if and
only if there exists a veto player. Moreover,
(1) x ∈ C(Γ ) if and only if xi = 0 for each i ∈ N who is not a veto player;
(2) when C(Γ ) 6= ∅, the nucleolus of Γ is given by xi =
1
k if i is a veto player
and xi = 0 otherwise, where k is the number of veto players.
2.2 Threshold Matching Games
We now introduce the definitions of threshold matching games. For more detailed
introduction, please refer to [1, 10, 14].
Given a graph G = (V,E), a matching M is a set of edges that no two
edges in M have a vertex in common. The size of M is denoted by |M |. A
matching is maximum if its size is maximum among all matchings in G. When
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there is a weight associated with each edge w : E → R+, a matching M is called
a maximum weight matching if its weight w(M) =
∑
e∈M w(e) is maximum
among all matchings.
For a weighted graph G = (V,E;w) and a threshold T ∈ R+, the cor-
responding threshold matching game (TMG) is a cooperative game defined as
Γ = (V,w;T ). We have the player set V and ∀ S ⊆ V ,
v(S) ,
{
1, if w(M) ≥ T , where M is the maximum weight matching of G[S]
0, otherwise
where G[S] is the induced subgraph by S on G.
Obviously, TMG is a simple game, and a player i is a veto player if and only
if the weight of the maximum weight matching in G[V \ {i}] is less than T . By
Proposition 1, when there is a veto player, the core and the nucleolus can be
given directly. However, when the core is empty, the least-core and the nucleolus
is hard to compute [1].
Proposition 2 [1] Computing the least-core and nucleolus of TMG is NP-hard
if the core of the TMG is empty.
In the following we restrict ourselves to threshold cardinality matching game
(TCMG) Γ = (V ;T ) based on unweighted graph G = (V,E). That is, ∀S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = 1 if the size of a maximum matching in G[S] is no less than T , and
v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Throughout the rest of this paper, we use the following notations:
– M : the set of matchings of G;
– MT : the set of matchings MT of G whose sizes are exact T , we call MT ∈
MT a minimal winning coalition;
– M∗ : the set of matchings M∗ of G with maximum size;
– v∗: the size of the maximum matching of G;
– n: n = |V | is the number of players.
Let G′ = (V ′, E′) be a subgraph of G. We usually use i ∈ G′ instead of i ∈ V ′,
and G′ \ {j} instead of G′[V ′ \ {j}]. For any imputation x, we define x(G′) ,∑
i∈V ′ xi and x(G
′
−j) , x(G
′ \ {j}) =
∑
i∈V ′,i6=j xi. Specially, ∀e = (i, j) ∈ E,
we let x(e) = x({i, j}) = xi + xj ; and ∀M ∈M, we let x(M) =
∑
e∈M x(e).
Before entering into the details, we begin with Gallai-Edmonds Decomposi-
tion of a graph, which plays an important role in the nucleolus characterization.
2.3 Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A matching of G is called a perfect matching if it
covers all vertices of G, and a nearly perfect matching if it covers all vertices
except one. G is called factor-critical if removing any vertex of G, the rest graph
has a perfect matching.
Given A ⊆ V , let G \ A denote the subgraph induced by vertices V \ A.
G\A is composed of one or several maximal connected components (hereinafter
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referred to as components). A component of G \ A is called even (odd) if it
contains even (odd) number of vertices. Denote by B = B(A) and D = D(A)
the set of even components and odd components in G \A, respectively. We use
V (B) (V (D)) to represent all vertices in even (odd) components. A set A ⊆ V
is called a Tutte set if each maximum matching M∗ of G can be decomposed
as M∗ = MB ∪MA,D ∪MD, where MB induces a perfect matching in any even
component B ∈ B,MD induces a nearly perfect matching in any odd component
D ∈ D, andMA,D is a matching which matches every vertex in A to some vertex
in an odd component in D. Thus, if A is a Tutte set, the size v∗ of a maximum
matching in G satisfies
v∗ =
∑
B∈B
|B|
2
+ |A|+
∑
D∈D
(|D| − 1)
2
.
Lemma 1 (Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition) [14,19,23] Given G = (V,E),
one can construct a Tutte set A ⊆ V in polynomial time such that
1. all odd components D ∈ D are factor-critical;
2. ∀D ∈ D there is a maximum matching M∗ of G which does not completely
cover D (we say M∗ leaves D uncovered).
In the following we assume that A ⊆ V is a fixed Tutte set satisfying the
condition 1 and 2 in Lemma 1. Thus, for such a Tutte set A, we have the following
facts:
1) For any D ∈ D and any maximum matching M∗, M∗ matches at most
one vertex in A to D, hence, |A| ≤ |D|. And when D 6= ∅, |A| < |D|.
2) For any Tutte set A satisfying conditions in Lemma 1, the size of A∪V (B)
is fixed which does not change with the different choice of A.
3 Least-core of TCMG
In this section we firstly show that the least-core problem for TCMG is much
easier than that for TMG by providing a polynomial time algorithm. Besides,
we introduce a non-cooperative two-player zero-sum game, called matching in-
tercept game. There is a close relationship between the mixed Nash equilibrium
of this game and the least-core of TCMG.
Throughout this section, let Γ = (V ;T ) be the TCMG defined on an un-
weighted graph G = (V,E) with threshold T : 1 ≤ T ≤ v∗. Since both testing
the core nonemptiness and finding a core member can be done efficiently, we
focus on the case where C(Γ ) = ∅, i.e., there is no veto players in Γ .
3.1 Least-core
For a TCMG Γ = (V ;T ), denote E(Γ ) = {{i} : i ∈ V } ∪ {{MT : MT ∈
MT }}∪{V }. We call a coalition S ∈ E(Γ ) essential coalition. We can show that
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for Γ , the least-core and nucleolus can be determined completely by the essential
coalitions.
Suppose S ⊆ V is a coalition of Γ . If S wins, then S contains a minimal
winning coalition MT ∈ MT , and
x(S)− v(S) = x(MT )− 1 +
∑
i∈S\V (MT )
xi ≥ x(MT )− 1.
Since xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V , S cannot be fixed before MT or any i ∈ S\V (MT ).
After MT and all i ∈ S\V (MT ) are fixed, S is also fixed, i.e. coalitions like S
are redundant; If S loses, we can decompose S in the following way:
x(S)− v(S) =
∑
i∈V (S)
xi ≥ xi, i ∈ S.
We can conclude that S cannot be fixed before any i ∈ V (S) through the same
analysis. When all i ∈ V (S) are fixed, S is fixed, i.e. S is also redundant in this
case.
From above analysis, we can conclude that the least-core LC(Γ ) of TCMG
can be characterized as the optimal solution of the following linear program
LPT1 :
LPT1 :
max ε
s.t.

x(MT ) ≥ 1 + ε, ∀MT ∈ MT
x(V ) = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
We can obtain the same result in terms of the nucleolus, i.e., we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 Dropping the constraints associated with all S /∈ E(Γ ) will not
change the result of LP1 and SLP (η(Γ )).
Therefore, when the threshold T is a fixed number independent of the input
size, the size of the linear programs in LP1 and SLP (η(Γ )) are all polynomial.
It follows that the least-core and the nucleolus can be computed efficiently. How-
ever, when the threshold T is relevant to the input size, the difficulty on com-
puting is that each linear program in LP1 and SLP (η(Γ )) remains exponential
size and we lack the understanding of the composition of Jr. In the following
sections, we assume the threshold T is relevant to the input size.
We firstly show that least-core can be solved efficiently by ellipsoid method
with a polynomial time separation oracle.
Theorem 1 Let Γ = (V ;T ) be a TCMG with empty core. Then the problems
of computing the LC(Γ ) value, finding a LC(Γ ) member and checking if an im-
putation is in LC(Γ ) are all polynomial time solvable.
Proof. A polynomial time separation oracle for LPT1 is as follows. Let (x, ε) be a
candidate solution for LPT1 . Setting edge cost c˜(e) = xi+xj (∀e = (i, j) ∈ E) on
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the edge set of graph G = (V,E). Then we compute the minimum cost matching
M of size T . If x(M) ≥ 1 + ε, then (x, ε) is a feasible solution; otherwise, the
inequality x(M) ≥ 1+ ε is a violated constraint. Here, computing the minimum
cost matching of fixed size can be done in polynomial time. ⊓⊔
The above theorem shows that finding an imputation in the least-core of
TCMG is not as hard as that of the general case TMG.
In the following, we further provide a characterization of the least core of
TCMG under some conditions. Denote MT = {M1,M2, · · · ,Mm} be the set of
all matchings whose sizes are exact T , and let a1, a2, · · · , am be the indicator
vectors of the matchings in MT . Consider the dual program of LPT1 :
DLPT1 :
min δ − 1
s.t.

∑
Mj :i∈Mj
yj ≤ δ, i = 1, 2, · · · , n∑m
j=1 yj = 1
yj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m.
Followed from the duality theorem, DLPT1 has the same optimal value as LP
T
1 .
Hence, we have the following result which is quite useful in the algorithm design
for the nucleolus in next sections.
Theorem 2 Let Γ = (V ;T ) be a TCMG with empty core. If (2Tn , · · · ,
2T
n )n is
a convex combination of a1, a2 · · · , am, then
1. the value of LC(Γ ) is ε = 2Tn − 1;
2. ( 1n , · · · ,
1
n )n ∈ LC(Γ );
3. if there exists a convex combination and the coefficient corresponding to ai
is strictly greater than zero, we have that the i-th constraint belongs to J1 in
SLP (η(Γ )).
Proof. The condition (2Tn , · · · ,
2T
n )n is the convex combination of aj (j = 1, 2, · · · ,m)
is equivalent to the fact that there is a feasible solution to DLPT1 with the ob-
jective function value being 2Tn − 1. On the other hand, it is easy to check
(x, ε) = ( 1n , · · · ,
1
n ,
2T
n − 1) is feasible to LP
T
1 . Followed from duality theorem
of LP, (x, ε) = ( 1n , · · · ,
1
n ,
2T
n − 1) is an optimal solution of LP
T
1 , yielding that
( 1n , · · · ,
1
n )n ∈ LC(Γ ). By Complementary Slackness Theorem, we know if ai > 0,
the i-th constraint is tight in each optimal solution. Thus, it belongs to J1 in
SLP (η(Γ )). ⊓⊔
3.2 Matching Intercept Games
Now we define a non-cooperative zero-sum game on graph G = (V,E) with two
players, the interceptor and the matcher. The pure strategy set of the interceptor
is V and the pure strategy set of the matcher is MT . If the vertex chosen by
the interceptor intersects with the matching chosen by the matcher, then the
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interceptor wins and gets payoff 1; otherwise, he loses and gets payoff 0. We call
this non-cooperative game matching intercept game(MIG).
For the notion of mixed Nash Equilibrium, players select strategies at random
and act to maximum their own expected profit. In MIG, let p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn)
be the interceptor’s probability distribution over his pure strategies, then based
on Maxmin Theorem, the optimal solution of the following linear program gives
the mixed Nash Equilibrium of MIG:
L˜P
T
1 :
max α
s.t.

p(MT ) ≥ α, ∀MT ∈ MT
p(V ) = 1
pi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
It is obvious that linear program L˜P
T
1 is equivalent to linear programLP
T
1 . Thus,
for TCMG and MIG defined on the same graph G, the least-core of TCMG is
the same as the mixed Nash Equilibrium of MIG.
In the following sections, we focus on the following three typical cases of
TCMG to give a clearer characterization on the nucleolus:
– Edge Coalitional Games (ECG): T = 1 (section 4);
– TCMG on graphs with a perfect matching (section 5);
– TCMG on bipartite graphs (section 6).
We aim to show that η(Γ ) is completely determined by edge coalitions (Coalition
which contains exact two vertices and these two vertices form a edge in G is called
edge coalition.), single player coalitions (which contains only one player) as well
as grand coalition rather than essential coalitions.
4 Edge Coalitional Games (T=1)
In this section, we consider the edge coalitional game (ECG) Γ 1 = (V ; 1) defined
on an unweighted graph G = (V,E), i.e., the TCMG with threshold T = 1. If
there is a 0-degree vertex in G, then it has no contribution to any coalitions, i.e.,
its allocation must be 0. In the following, we assume that there is no 0-degree
vertices in G. It is easy to see that C(Γ 1) 6= ∅ if and only if there exists a vertex
i ∈ V such that there is no edges in G \ {i}, that is, the graph G is a star-like
graph.
When C(Γ 1) = ∅, the linear program for LC(Γ 1) is as follows:
LP 11 :
max ε
s.t.

xi + xj ≥ 1 + ε, ∀e = (i, j) ∈ E
x(V ) = 1
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
According to Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition, every graph can be decom-
posed into A, B, D. Let D0 be the set of singletons in D (D0 may be empty).
Since D0 is the set of singletons, we ambiguously use D0 instead of V (D0). Let
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G0 be a bipartite graph with vertex set A ∪D0 and edge set consisting of edges
with two endpoints in A and D0 separately. Find a maximum matching M0 in
G0. Denote the matched vertices in A and D0 by A1 and D01 with respect to
M0. Let A2 = A \A1 and D02 = D \ D01.
We firstly consider the simple case that D02 = ∅, that is, all singletons in D
can be matched to A. By making use of Theorem 2, we show that in this case,
the least-core value and an imputation in the least-core can be obtained directly.
Then we generalize the result into the case D02 6= ∅.
Theorem 3 Given an ECG Γ 1 = (V ; 1), if D02 = ∅, then the value of LC(Γ 1)
is ε = 2n − 1 and (
1
n , · · · ,
1
n )n ∈ LC(Γ ).
Proof. By Theorem 2, it is enough to show that ( 2n , · · · ,
2
n ) is the convex com-
bination of the coefficients of xi + xj ≥ 1 + ε, e = (i, j) ∈ E.
Since D02 = ∅, let M be a maximum matching in G such that M matches
all D0 into A. Then D0 ⊆ D1 , {D ∈ D : D is covered by M} and D2 , D \D1
is the set of uncovered factor-critical graphs. So for any Di ∈ D2, we have ni =
|Di| ≥ 3. Let M˜ is the induced matching fromM in V (B)∪A∪V (D1). Then M˜ is
a perfect matching in G[V (B)∪A∪V (D1)]. For any edge e ∈ M˜ , we set
2
n to the
element in the convex combination corresponding to this constraint. There are
in total |V (B)∪A∪V (D1)|2 constraints, and each vertex in V (B)∪A∪V (D1) appears
exactly once in these constraints. For any Di ∈ D2, since it is factor-critical, then
for every vertex k ∈ V (Di), there exists a perfect matchingMk in G[V (Di)\{k}].
For any edge e ∈ Mk, we set
2
(ni−1)n
to the element in the convex combination
corresponding to this constraint. When we traverse all vertices k ∈ V (Di), there
are in total ni(ni−1)2 constraints, and for each vertex k, it appears in exactly
ni− 1 constraints. Set the elements in the convex combination corresponding to
all other constraints to be 0. It is easy to check the convex combination of these
constraints is ( 2n , · · · ,
2
n ). This finishes our proof. ⊓⊔
If D02 6= ∅, we cannot find such a convex combination since there is no
edges in D02. But if we delete D02 from G, we can find a convex combination
in G′ = G[V \ D02] by using the similar argument in the proof of Theorem 3.
Denote Γ ′ to be the corresponding ECG defined on G′. Then the value of LC(Γ ′)
is 2n′ − 1 where n
′ = n − |D02|. We can know
2
n′ − 1 is an upper bound of the
value of LC(Γ 1). If we can find a feasible solution (x˜, ε) of the original game
with ε = 2n′ − 1, then the value of LC(Γ
1) is also 2n′ − 1. Consider the following
imputation:
x˜i =

1
n′ , i ∈ V (B)
2
n′ , i ∈ V (A) and D02 → i
1
n′ , i ∈ V (A) and D02 9 i
0, i ∈ V (D01) and D02 → i
1
n′ , i ∈ V (D01) and D02 9 i
0, i ∈ V (D02).
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Here, D02 → i represents i is reachable from D02 by M0-alternating path in
G0; D02 9 i represents i is unreachable from D02 by M0-alternating path in G0.
We can easily check that the imputation x˜ with ε = 2n′ − 1 is feasible. Other-
wise, if there is an edge e ∈ E such that x˜(e) < 2n′ , e must be between a vertex
i ∈ D01 (and D02 → i) and a vertex in A2 or between a vertex in D02 and a
vertex in A2. But there exists a M0-augmenting path in G0 in these two cases,
contradicting to M is a maximum matching in G0. Hence, the value of LC(Γ 1)
is 2n′ − 1.
We then focus on the computing of nucleolus. Since we have seen ε1 =
2
n′ −1,
we can prove LP 1k in SLP (η(Γ
1)) can be rewritten as:
LP 1k :
max ε
s.t.

x(e) = 2n′ − ε1 + εr, e ∈ Er, r = 1, · · · , k − 1
xi = −ε1 + εr, i ∈ Vr, r = 1, · · · , k − 1
x(e) ≥ 2n′ − ε1 + ε, e ∈ E \
⋃k−1
r=1 Er
xi ≥ −ε1 + ε, i ∈ V \
⋃k−1
r=1 Vr
x(V ) = 1, xi ≥ 0, i ∈ V.
Initially set E0 = V0 = ∅ and ε0 = 0. The number εr is the optimal value of the
r-th program LP 1r , and Er = {e ∈ E : x(e) = 1 + εr, ∀x ∈ Xr}, Vr = {i ∈ N :
xi = 1−
2
n′ + εr, ∀x ∈ Xr}, where Xr = {x ∈ R
n : (x, εr) is an optimal solution
of LP 1r }.
In the next sections, we will show that for any threshold, LPTk have the same
appearance as LP 1k under some restrictions.
5 TCMG on Graph with Perfect Matching
Now we consider the general case Γ T = (V ;T ) with arbitrary threshold 1 ≤ T ≤
v∗. We denote the corresponding sequential linear programming as LPTk .
In the following theorem, we firstly show that for the graphs with a perfect
matching, the least-core of Γ T is independent of T . Then we use this character-
ization to prove that the nucleolus of Γ T can be obtained in polynomial time
and η(Γ T ) is also independent of T , i.e., LPTk can be rewritten as:
LPTk :
max εT
s.t.

x(e) = 2n − ε
T
1 + ε
T
r , e ∈ Er, r = 1, · · · , k − 1
xi = −εT1 + ε
T
r , i ∈ Vr , r = 1, · · · , k − 1
x(e) ≥ 2n − ε
T
1 + ε
T , e ∈ E \
⋃k−1
r=1 Er
xi ≥ −εT1 + ε
T , i ∈ V \
⋃k−1
r=1 Vr
x(V ) = 1, xi ≥ 0, i ∈ V.
(1)
Initially, we set E0 = V0 = ∅ and εT0 = 0. The number ε
T
r is the optimal
value of the r-th program LPTr , and Er = {e ∈ E : x(e) = 1 + ε
T
r , ∀x ∈ Xr},
Vr = {i ∈ N : xi = 1 −
2
n + ε
T
r , ∀x ∈ Xr}, where Xr = {x ∈ R
n : (x, εTr ) is an
optimal solution of LPTr }.
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Theorem 4 Suppose G = (V,E) is a simple graph which has a perfect matching
and Γ T = (V ;T ) is a TCMG defined on G. Let Γ 1 = (V ; 1) be the corresponding
ECG defined also on G. Then
1. the value of LC(Γ T ) is εT1 =
2T
n − 1;
2. LC(Γ T ) = LC(Γ 1);
3. η(Γ T ) = η(Γ 1).
Proof.
1. By Theorem 2, it is enough to show that (2Tn , · · · ,
2T
n ) is the convex com-
bination of the coefficients of x(MT ) ≥ 1 + ε,MT ∈ MT . Since G has a perfect
matching M∗, then v∗ = n2 . Without loss of generality, we reset the labels of
players as (1, 2), · · · , (n − 1, n), here (i, j) means it is a matching edge in M∗.
Then there are constraints like the following in LPT1
(x1 + x2) + · · ·+ (x2T−1 + x2T ) ≥ 1 + ε
T
(x3 + x4) + · · ·+ (x2T+1 + x2T+2) ≥ 1 + ε
T
· · ·
(xn−1 + xn) + · · ·+ (x2T−3 + x2T−2) ≥ 1 + ε
T .
(2)
We put all the constraints above into the combination with an element 2n . There
are in total n2 constraints, and each vertex in V appears exactly T times in these
constraints. It is easy to check this convex combination of these constraints is
(2Tn , · · · ,
2T
n ).
2. Suppose x = (x1, · · · , xn) with εT =
2T
n − 1 is an optimal solution in LP
T
1
(the first linear program in SLP (η(Γ T ))), e = (i, j) is a maximum matching
edge in M∗. Since constraints in (2) are fixed, then
xi + xj =
2
n
, ∀e = (i, j) ∈M∗. (3)
If e = (i, j) is not an edge ofM∗, e must be in a matchingM ′ with size v∗−1
and all the other v∗− 2 edges except e are belonging to M∗, i.e., those edges are
fixed to 2n . Since for all MT ∈MT , x(MT ) ≥ 1 + ε
T = 2Tn , we have
xi + xj ≥
2
n
, ∀ e = (i, j) ∈ E \M∗. (4)
From (3) and (4), we can see that (x, 2n − 1) is also an optimal solution of LP
1
1 .
On the other hand, let x′ = (x′1, · · · , x
′
n) with ε
1
1 =
2
n − 1 be an optimal
solution in LP 11 . We can quickly check x
′ with εT =
2T
n − 1 is an optimal
solution in LPT1 .
Therefore, LC(Γ T ) = LC(Γ ).
3. Suppose the set of fixed constraints in LPT1 is M
′
T ⊆MT (and the set of
fixed coalitions is also M′T ) and E1 is the fixed constraints of LP
1
1 . Firstly, we
prove that ET = E1, ET = {e|e ∈MT ∈M′T }.
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Since the system of linear equations x(MT ) =
2T
n ,MT ∈M
′
T is equivalent to
the system of linear equations x(e) = 2n , e ∈ ET . Otherwise, if there exists some
e ∈MT ∈M′T with x(e) >
2
n , x(MT ) cannot equal to
2T
n , due to x(e) ≥
2
n , ∀e ∈
E. Because LC(Γ T ) = LC(Γ ), ET = E1.
Then we simplify the sequence of linear programs.
Case 1: Consider the winning constraints like
x(S) =
∑
e∈E′
x(e) +
∑
e∈E′′
x(e) +
∑
i∈V ′
xi ≥ 1 + ε
T .
Here, E′ ⊆ E,E′ ∩ E1 = ∅, E′′ ⊆ E1 and V ′ ⊆ V . The size of the maximum
matching in S = V (E′) ∪ V (E′′) ∪ V ′ is not less than T and suppose |E′| ≥ 2.
It will be fixed after any
x(e) +
∑
e∈S′⊆E1, |S′|=T−1
x(e) ≥ 1 + εT , e ∈ E′ (5)
and
xi +
∑
e∈S′′⊆E1, |S′′|=T
x(e) ≥ 1 + εT , i ∈ V ′, (6)
since the excess of the coalition S is not less than any coalition {e} ∪ S′ or
{i} ∪ S′′. Moreover, it will be fixed automatically after all constraints like (5)
and (6) get fixed.
Due to result 1 and 2 above, we can rewrite (5) and (6) as
x(e) ≥
2
n
− εT1 + ε
T , e ∈ E \ E1, (7)
xi ≥ −ε
T
1 + ε
T , i ∈ V. (8)
Case 2: Consider the losing constraints like
x(S) =
∑
e/∈E1
x(e) +
∑
e∈E1
x(e) +
∑
xi ≥ ε
T .
The maximum matching in S is less than T and it will be fixed after (7) and (8),
since the excess of the coalition S is not less than any subset in S. Moreover, it
will be fixed automatically after all constraints like (7) and (8) get fixed.
Hence, the sequential linear programs LPTk of η(Γ
T ) can be rewritten as
linear program (1). It is obvious that the optimal solutions of LPTk and LP
1
k are
the same except εTk = ε
1
k +
2(T−1)
n before εk gets positive, i.e., η(Γ
T ) = η(Γ ).
This finishes our proof. ⊓⊔
6 TCMG on Bipartite Graphs
For bipartite graphs, we can obtain the similar result as Theorem 4. Let G =
(L,R;E) be a bipartite graph with vertex set L ∪ R and edge set E. Find a
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maximum matching M∗ in G. Denote the matched vertices in L and R as L1
and R1 with respect to M
∗ respectively. Let L2 = L \ L1 and R2 = R \R1.
If both L2 and R2 are empty, it is reduced to the situation in section 5. So
we assume at least one of L2 and R2 is not empty.
If we delete L2 and R2 from G, we can find the least-core value and an im-
putation in least-core by Theorem 4. Denote Γ ′ to be the corresponding TCMG
defined on G′ where G′ is the induced subgraph by (L ∪ R) \ (L2 ∪ R2) in G.
Then the value of LC(Γ ′) is 2Tn′ − 1 where n
′ = n − |L2| − |R2|. It is obvious
that 2Tn′ − 1 is an upper bound of the value of LC(Γ
T ). We then show that this
is actually the value of the least-core in the bipartite graphs.
Theorem 5 Suppose G = (L,R;E) is a bipartite graph and Γ T = (V ;T ) is a
TCMG defined on G. Let Γ 1 = (V ; 1) be the corresponding ECG defined also on
G. Then
1. the value of LC(Γ T ) is εT1 =
2T
n′ − 1;
2. LC(Γ T ) = LC(Γ 1);
3. η(Γ T ) = η(Γ 1).
Here n′ = n− |L2| − |R2|.
Proof. We only prove the fist result. The second and the third ones are the same
as Theorem 4.
If we can find a feasible solution (x˜, ε) of the original game with ε = 2Tn′ − 1,
then the value of LC(Γ 1) is also 2Tn′ − 1. Here, we use L2 → i, i ∈ L1 ∪ R1 to
represent that i is reachable from L2 by M
∗-alternating path in G. We denote
these vertices which are in L1 by L11 and the vertices which are in R1 by R11;
Similarly,R2 → i, i ∈ L1∪R1 represents i is reachable fromR2 byM∗-alternating
path in G, and we denote these vertices which are in L1 by L12 and the vertices
which are in R1 by R12. Denote L13 = L1\(L11 ∪ L12), R13 = R1\(R11 ∪ R12).
Note that L11∩L12 = ∅ and R11∩R12 = ∅. Otherwise, without loss of generality,
we assume k ∈ L11∩L12. Then, there exists twoM
∗-alternating paths in G, P1 :
l2 → k, l2 ∈ L2 and P2 : r2 → k, r2 ∈ R2. Find k′ to be the first intersection point
of P1 and P2. Here first intersection point means there is no other intersection
points locating in l2
P1−→ k′ or r2
P2−→ k′. We know that one of the two edges
incidence of k′ in P1 and P2 is matched edge and the other is unmatched. Then
we find a M∗-augmenting path in G: l2
P1−→ k′
P2−→ r2, contradicting to M∗ is a
maximum matching . Hence such k does not exist.
Consider the following imputation:
x˜i =

0, i ∈ L2 ∪R2
2
n′ , i ∈ R11 ∪ L12
0, i ∈ L11 ∪R12
1
n′ , i ∈ L13 ∪R13
Therefore our imputation x˜ is well defined. Then we can easily check that
the imputation x˜ with ε = 2Tn′ − 1 is feasible like section 4. In fact, we can find
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the union of L11 and R12 (or L12 and R11) is a Tutte set in Gallai-Edmonds
Decomposition. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we first design a polynomial time algorithm to compute the least-
core for threshold cardinality matching games. Based on a general characteri-
zation of the least-core for TCMG, we show that computing the nucleolus can
be done efficiently for TCMGs defined on graphs with a perfect matching and
bipartite graphs.
We conjecture that the ideas behind these results can be generalized to com-
pute the nucleolus of TCMGs defined on general graphs. Another interesting
direction is to understand how far can these techniques be extended to the
computation of the least-core and the nucleolus of other threshold versions of
cooperative games [1].
References
1. Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, and Paul Harrenstein. Monotone cooperative games and
their threshold versions. In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, volume 1, pages 1107–1114, 2010.
2. Haris Aziz, Oded Lachish, Mike Paterson, and Rahul Savani. Wiretapping a hidden
network. In Internet and Network Economics, pages 438–446. Springer, 2009.
3. Pe´ter Biro´, Walter Kern, and Danie¨l Paulusma. Computing solutions for matching
games. International journal of game theory, 41(1):75–90, 2012.
4. Rodica Braˆnzei, Elena In˜arra, Stef Tijs, and Jose´ M Zarzuelo. A simple algorithm
for the nucleolus of airport profit games. International Journal of Game Theory,
34(2):259–272, 2006.
5. Ning Chen, Pinyan Lu, and Hongyang Zhang. Computing the nucleolus of match-
ing, cover and clique games. In Proceedings of the 26th AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence, 2012.
6. Xiaotie Deng, Qizhi Fang, and Xiaoxun Sun. Finding nucleolus of flow game.
Journal of combinatorial optimization, 18(1):64–86, 2009.
7. Xiaotie Deng, Toshihide Ibaraki, and Hiroshi Nagamochi. Algorithmic aspects of
the core of combinatorial optimization games. Mathematics of Operations Research,
24(3):751–766, 1999.
8. Xiaotie Deng and Christos H Papadimitriou. On the complexity of cooperative
solution concepts. Mathematics of Operations Research, 19(2):257–266, 1994.
9. Jack Edmonds. Paths, trees, and flowers. Canadian Journal of mathematics,
17(3):449–467, 1965.
10. Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W Goldberg, and Michael Wooldridge.
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games. In Proceedings of the
National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, volume 22, page 718, 2007.
11. Edith Elkind and Dmitrii Pasechnik. Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting
games. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, pages 327–335, 2009.
15
12. Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, and Jeroen Kuipers. Note computing the nucleolus of
min-cost spanning tree games is np-hard. International Journal of Game Theory,
27(3):443–450, 1998.
13. Daniel Granot, M Maschler, G Owen, and WR Zhu. The kernel/nucleolus of a
standard tree game. International Journal of Game Theory, 25(2):219–244, 1996.
14. Walter Kern and Danie¨l Paulusma. Matching games: the least-core and the nucle-
olus. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28(2):294–308, 2003.
15. Alexander Kopelowitz. Computation of the kernels of simple games and the nu-
cleolus of n-person games. Technical report, DTIC Document, 1967.
16. Michael Maschler, Bezalel Peleg, and Lloyd S Shapley. Geometric properties of
the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts. Mathematics of Operations
Research, 4(4):303–338, 1979.
17. Nimrod Megiddo. Computational complexity of the game theory approach to cost
allocation for a tree. Mathematics of Operations Research, 3(3):189–196, 1978.
18. Martin J Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A course in game theory. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1994.
19. MD Plummer and L Lova´sz. Matching theory. Access Online via Elsevier, 1986.
20. David Schmeidler. The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal
on applied mathematics, 17(6):1163–1170, 1969.
21. Lloyd S Shapley and Martin Shubik. The assignment game i: The core. Interna-
tional Journal of Game Theory, 1(1):111–130, 1971.
22. Tama´s Solymosi and Tirukkannamangai ES Raghavan. An algorithm for find-
ing the nucleolus of assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory,
23(2):119–143, 1994.
23. Douglas B West. A short proof of the berge–tutte formula and the gallai–edmonds
structure theorem. European Journal of Combinatorics, 32(5):674–676, 2011.
16
